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In thinking about today's panel presentation, I searched for an appropriate
analogy that might readily convey what we advisors to the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers' faced in considering the conflict of interest rules. I focus in
particular on the drafting of section 204, which addresses the question of whether
screens should be allowed to wall off a lawyer tainted by the representation of a
former client so the rest of her current law firm can continue to represent clients
they otherwise could not. How did we extrapolate black letter from traditional
sources while wrestling with the modem realities of law practice?'
Finally, just before Christmas, I stumbled across such an analogy in a very
unlikely way. After years of lobbying, my eleven-year-old daughter won the "I want
a dog" battle. I found a wonderful Christmas puppy at the Humane Society. When
I asked, "What is she?" they replied: "We don't know." But, trying to sell her, they
added: "We think she is probably a terrier of some sort, combined with cocker
spaniel and poodle." Satisfied that I'd found a bit of everything, I brought her
home. But my family still wonders - what will she look like when she grows up?
When we asked our vet, he answered: "I honestly don't know."
Deliberating the Restatement sections as an advisor was like looking at my puppy.
We could isolate several distinct genetic strains in the law, but were unable to detect
which would become dominant as it matured. Eventually, satisfied that we'd found
a bit of everything, we adopted a compromise provision.
Let me set the scene for you. We had already agreed on a series of fairly
noncontroversial propositions. First, that absent client consent,3 confidential client
information could not be used against a former client.' Second, we agreed to a
restatement of the TC Theatres substantial relationship test,5 specifically designed
to protect the former client who complains about such misuse of previous
confidences.6 This rule requires a court to reconstruct the legal and factual nature
* Anderson-Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo. J.D., 1974, University of
Marquette School of Law; B.A., 1969, St. Olaf College. Research support for this article was provided
by an endowment funded by Eugene N. Balk and the Anderson Group. I appreciate the research
assistance of The University of Toledo law students, Kathryn Hale and Robert Muller. I also appreciate
the prodding of my colleague Lee A. Pizzimenti and the assembled academics in San Francisco who
challenged my analysis. See Symposium Question and Answer Session, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 91 (1993).
1. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, I GEO. J.
LEGAL EThics 195 (1987).
2. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991)
(Removing Imputation).
3. Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
5. T.C. Theatres Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.9 (1989). The rule states: "(a) A lawyer
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of the prior representation and to compare it with the current representation of an
opposing party. If the matters are substantially related, the court irrebuttably
presumes both receipt and use of former client confidences by the lawyer and
disqualifies her from any further representation of opposing interests.!
The third step was to agree with the courts and professional rules that impute one
lawyer's disqualification to the rest of his firm.' We then restated the one clear
exception to the substantial relationship presumption: the peripheral representation
rule of Silver Chrysler Plymouth.' When a disqualified lawyer is presumed to have
confidences due to a vicarious as opposed to an actual representation of the former
client, the presumption of receipt of confidential information becomes rebuttable."0
We then focused on the final issue requiring a resolution in section 204: What
of a lawyer who actually represented the former client in a previous substantially
related matter and now moves to a new law firm that represents an adversary? Is
it sufficient that the lawyer be screened from participating in the case to prevent use
of confidences against the former client? Or, absent the former client's consent,
does the tainted newly hired lawyer simply vicariously disqualify the rest of his new
firm as well?
Like my puppy, the terrier initially appeared dominant in our Restatement debate.
The terrier was that tenacious black letter of the Model Rules and majority of the
cases which state that screens are not allowed," except in the special situation of
who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same
or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of
the former client unlessthe former client consents after consultation ...." Id.; see also REsTATEMENT
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 1989). Section 204 states:
A lawyer prohibited from representing a client or otherwise acting solely because of
an affiliation described in Sec. 203 may nonetheless so represent or act when:
(1) The lawyer terminates the affiliation that created the imputed prohibition without
receiving confidential information of the client;
(2) The lawyer remains in the affiliation and the primarily prohibited lawyer terminates
the affiliation that created the imputation and has not communicated confidential
information of the client to any other lawyer in the affiliation ....
Id.
7. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cit. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1979). But see Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1991); INA
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Sandra Mazliah,
Conflicts of Interest: Subsequent Adverse Representation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ErHIcs 79, 82 (1991).
8. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 5-105(D) (1991); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1991).
9. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
aftd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cwr. 1975).
10. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Gas-A-
Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 557 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); Baxter Diagnostics v. AVL Scientific Corp., No.
CV 91-4178 RG(Ex), 1992 WL 158745 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 1992); Koch v. Koch Indus., No. 85-1636-C,
1992 WL 156922 (D. Kan June 11, 1992); United States v. Davis, 780 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1991); SEC
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss1/5
1993] LAW FIRM SCREENS 55
former government lawyers. 2 The first draft of the Restatement embodied this
rule."
Hiding beneath this wiry, hearty, apparently dominant characteristic of the law
was a smaller piece of genetic history: cases that opened the door to screens for
private as well as public lawyers. 4 Like the poodle in my puppy, this seductive
strain of law appeared very different from the Model Rule approach and seemed to
resist shedding in the few jurisdictions that had recognized it." For some of the
v. ESM Group, 66 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D.FIa. 1986); INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
Mallard v. MJV "Germundo," 530 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff d, 746 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984);
W.E. Basset Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn. 1961), affd per curiam, 302 F.2d
268 (2d Cir. 1962); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Otaka,
Inc. v. Klein, 791 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1990); Lansing-Delaware Water Dist. v. Oak Lane Park, Inc., 808 P.2d
1369 (Kan. 1991); Freezer Servs. v. Mullen, 458 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1990); People v. Gelbman, 568
N.Y.S.2d 867 (Justice Ct., Rockland County 1991); Petroleum Wholesale v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Burkes v. Hales, 478 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.11 (1983); see, e.g., Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated for lack ofjurisdiction, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981);
Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 342 (1976); see also C. Randolph Sullivan, Building Chinese
Walls in Virginia: Should Virginia Recognize the Chinese Wall Defense to Vicarious Disqualification?,
26 U. RICH. L. REV. 391 (1992); James B. McLaren, Jr., The Future of the Chinese Wall Defense to
Vicarious Disqualification of a Former Government Attorney's Law Firm, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151
(1981).
13. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 1989).
14. Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, 899 F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Manning v. Waring, Cox,
James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744
F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dugar v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, No. 92-C-1621, 1992 WL 142302
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 1992); Lofton v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 90-C-5796, 1992 WL 3731
(N.D. III. Jan. 7, 1992); Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., No. 84-C-6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D.
Il. June 24, 1991); Keams v. Chrysler Corp., 771 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Margiotta v.
McLaren, 115 B.R. 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); Walker v. Sweet Cravings, Inc., No. 89-CV-73084-
DT, 1990 WL 300284 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1990); Geisler v. Wyeth Lab., 716 F. Supp. 520 (D. Kan.
1989); In re Stamford Color Photo, Inc., 98 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); Renz v. Beeman, No. 87-
CV-487, 1989 WL 16062 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1989); Salamon v. Messina, No. 87-C-2097, 1989 WL
6502 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 25, 1989); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D.
Del. 1986); Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hughes v. Pain,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill. 1983); INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin,
635 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983); Rowley
v. Waterfront Airways, 113 A.D.2d 926 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
15. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying
7th Cir. law); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983);
Novo Terapeutisk v. Baxter Travenol, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Dugar v. Board of Educ. of
Chicago, No. 92-C-1621, 1992 WL 142302 (N.D. 11. June 18, 1992); Lofton v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., No. 90-C-5796, 1992 WL 3731 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1992); Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc.
v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D. III. June 24, 1991); Salamon v. Messina,
No. 87-C-2097, 1989 WL 6502 (N.D. Ill. Jan 25, 1989); Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 637
F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hughes v. Pain, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663 (N.D.
Il1. 1983). State courts within the Seventh Circuit have followed these federal decisions. See, e.g.,
Thornton v. Thornton, 486 N.E.2d 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Weglarz v. Bruck, 470 N.E.2d 21 (111. App.
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Restatement advisors, it seemed impossible to distinguish the inviting smoothness
of this apparently more sophisticated approach from the peripheral representation
exception. Both screens and the peripheral representation exception procedurally
operate in the same way: They rebut the presumption created by the substantial
relationship test. 6
Others, including me, distinguished the peripheral representation rule from the
screens in private firms cases. We argued that, although both procedurally operate
to rebut the presumption, the substance of the two rules diverged substantially. The
peripheral representation rule allows a lawyer whose initial taint is only vicarious
to rebut the receipt of confidential information. This protects the prior client
because the lawyer i3 required to prove that she never received any confidential
information in the first place. The screen rule, on the other hand, admits receipt of
the information. It does not act to rebut the presumption but instead promises
protection from using these secrets by isolating the tainted lawyer from the rest of
her firm.17 Implicitly recognizing this distinction, most courts correctly hold that in
the absence of the former client's consent to the substantially related representation
or the former lawyer's peripheral representation, the presumption of both receipt and
ability to use confidential information is irrebuttable."
Once these issues surfaced in the Restatement debate, a definite split became
evident among the Restatement advisors. This is where I first began to see the
conflict about conflicts. Both groups seemed blinded by self interest. One group
(the majority it turned out) - like my Humane Society - pragmatically wanted to
sell the dog. They focused less on the settled law, and more on where and why it
should change and develop. The other group of advisors - I'll call them the purist
minority9 - seemed (to me at least) more like my vet, valiantly trying to isolate
the various genetic strains and admitting the difficulty of accurately predicting the
size and shape of the fully grown animal.
I'll bet you can't guess the viewpoint of the majority of practitioners in the group.
"Trust us," they argued: the peripheral representation exception and screens are
indistinguishable. Screens prevent leaks just as the peripheral representation rule
assures that confidential information is not passed to others. This group was joined
by Geoffrey Hazard of Yale who pleaded for a pragmatic reality check: Why was
the purist minority so blinded by the policy of confidentiality to the former
Ct. 1984); Berg v. Marine Trust Co., 416 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); see also Craig A. Peterson,
Rebuttable Presumptions amd Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious
Disqualifications of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 399 (1984).
16. See, e.g., M. Peter Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means ofAvoiding Law Firm Disqualification When
a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 399 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Marl Brodeur, Building Chinese Walls: Current Implementation and a Proposal for
Reforming Law Firm Disqualification, 7 R Fv. LMG. 167 (1988); Stephen H. Goldberg, The Former
Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227,
279 (1987); Donald R. McMinn, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased Use of
Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1254 (1990).
18. See supra note 9.





client?z' Could we not understand the realities of modem practice and rely on the
integrity of the bar? Another practicing lawyer-advisor, Peter Moser, joined this
chorus, penning an article in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics that same
year.2' I, being completely free of conflict, argued that acceptance of this argument
boiled down to a leap of faith in favor of the practitioners. I was initially surprised
when they agreed. Surprise turned to understanding, however, when they added that
only skeptics who live in ivory towers would fail to trust the bar.
This was a comment aimed not only at me, but also at Thomas Morgan, the
associate reporter who drafted the conflicts rules. His first draft took the traditional
no-screen approach and he was already on record in a published article as
concluding that screens are a "problem because.... a client can often never know
for sure when or whether his confidence has been abused. That the trustworthy
must suffer for the sins of the rest is unfortunate, but client confidence must be the
key.o
2 2
The practitioner's comments were also aimed at Chief Reporter Charles Wolfram,
who had summarized his views regarding screens in very colorful language in his
hornbook: "In the end there is little but the self-serving assurance of the screening-
lawyer foxes that they will carefully guard the screened lawyer chickens."' The
issue was joined.
Eventually, three other practitioners in the group convinced me I was right after
all. The first, a Philadelphia lawyer who practices in a jurisdiction that allows
screens, argued, complete with over a dozen pages of written narrative,' that even
if we trust lawyers, inadvertent leaks in screens were inevitable. Once allowed,
screens proliferate. A firm of one hundred lawyers with even a few lateral hires
soon has dozens or even hundreds of screens. Unless screened lawyers avoid
conversation with the rest of the firm entirely, inadvertent disclosure presents an
ever present risk.
This concern was shared by two others. The first was a former large-firm lawyer,
now loss prevention counsel to the largest malpractice insurer of large firms in the
country, who worried about liability when inevitable leaks occurred. Better to
decline representation of the other side than flirt with disaster, he argued. It didn't
surprise me to learn that the final practitioner who spoke against screens was from
20. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WiLLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.10:207, at 334 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that imposing
a rule of vicarious disqualification is based on the unwarranted assumption that lawyers will violate
professional norms).
21. Moser, supra note 16, at 399.
22. Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the Disqualified Lawyer: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong
Problem, 10 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 37, 54 (1987-88).
23. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.6.4, at 402 (1986).
24. Letter and essay from Lawrence Fox, Philadelphia, Pa., for the ABA Section of Litigation, to
author (July 27, 1990) (on file with author).
25. Robert E. O'Malley et al., Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L.
REV. 325, 358 (1989).
19931
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a relatively small town and practices in the smallest firm (about thirty lawyers)
represented by the advisors.
The result of this debate? The initial preliminary no-screen rule draft was
modified to allow screens, but only in limited cases. The second, third, and fourth
drafts that eventually passed both the ALI council and membership provide for
screens as long as confidential client information communicated to the personally
prohibited lawyer is "not likely to be significant in the later case,"' and both
timely' and adequate screening' procedures are followed.
What strikes me as disappointing about this debate and vote is not only that I
lost, but also that the entire argument focused on the wrong issues. Instead of
balancing the past client's rights against the current law firm's integrity, we should
have weighed concern for the past client against regard for the current client's right
to choose counsel. Had we recognized harm to the current client as the major
competing policy, perhaps we also would have noted that, though less often
mentioned in the cases, it nevertheless is cited as a central concern in the major
decisions that recognize screens."
Have we chosen correctly? We could have elected to outlaw screens because of
their dangers. This might, however, have meant an eventual limit on law firm size
or lawyer mobility. It also would have meant that ethics controlled the market for
legal services, not vice versa." Instead, we chose to open the door to screens and
watch carefully.3
Our choice bears a striking resemblance to a similar choice made by Investment
Bankers nearly thirty years ago. At first, they devised so-called "Chinese Walls" as
a separation between their underwriting and brokerage operations." They did so
initially as a defense against insider trader liability, just as screens are now touted
by law firms as a def-mse against disqualification.
The next step was to use screens as a defense in suits brought by investors
claiming breach of fiduciary duty because their brokers allegedly should have
26. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Preliminary Draft No. 4A, 1989);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Council Draft No. 3, 1989); RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991). The "not likely to be
significant" standard may create interpretive problems.
27. For examples of a timely screen, see United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
S11 S. Ct. 45 (1990). For examples of disqualification for an untimely screen, see Schiessle v. Stephens,
717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); Anaytica Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983);
Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
28. For examples of aCequate screens, see Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-
6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D. III. June 24, 1991); Kovacevic v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 641 F.
Supp. 237 (N.D. Il. 1986) (applying Eighth Circuit law).
29. See, e.g., Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 427 (D. 15el.
1986); see also McMinn, supra note 17, at 1249-50; Morgan, supra note 22, at 50-51; Comment, The
Chinese Wall Defense to larw-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 679 (1980).
30. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 354 (1953).
31. See Symposium Qaestion and Answer Session, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 31, 34 (1993).
32. Note, Unchanged Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of




known and then used the investment banker's secrets.33 This may be the next
stage of law firm litigation - breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits by current clients
who allege that screens prevented full advocacy of their position or, worse, that a
leaky screen cost them a long-term lawyer.'
Today brokerage firms seem to "have it all": investment banking services and
trading services. The legal quid pro quo, however, is that the SEC has recently
moved from permission to use screens to rules that require them. In fact, the
absence of proper institutional policies and procedures regarding screens today
creates the basis for liability - not only civil but criminal as well.'
This may be where the law is headed in jurisdictions that allow screening for
lawyers,37 Consider the consequences. Lawyers will soon be required to have
screens, including procedures that establish them, monitor them, and audit firm
compliance. If the broker's case history is instructive, these procedures and
policies will probably include three categories of requirements.
First, initial procedures to set up screens will have to be established. Second,
subsequent monitoring to assure that screens perform their required function will
need to be implemented. Finally, law firm policies and procedures that encourage
detection and correction of problems will have to be established and maintained.
Initial procedures begin with detection of conflicts by requiring that each newly
hired lawyer bring a complete list of former clients, including those not actually
represented by the newly hired lawyer but represented by her previous law firm
while she was there. An initial conflicts check should then be completed and
screens should be established in all cases where current clients of the firm oppose
a party formerly represented by the new lawyer's old law firm.38
These screens, to be adequate, must include physical separation of files,39
33. James R. Doty & David N. Powers, Chinese Walls: The Transformation of a Good Business
Practice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 155, 157 (1988) (discussing Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,439 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1974)).
34. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243 (N.J. 1988); Padco, Inc. v.
Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
35. Doty & Powers, supra note 33, at 173.
36. Id. at 174.
37. For examples of permissible screens with adequate procedures, see United States v. Goot, 894
F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 45 (1990); Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No.
87-C-6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D. 111. June 24, 1991); In re Chicago South Shore & South Bend R.R.,
101 B.R. 10 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1989). For cases identifying institutional mechanigms which were not met,
see Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) (no screen established); Analytica, Inc. V. NPD
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (institutional mechanisms not in place); LaSalle Nat'l Bank
v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (procedures not established at lawyer's entry into firm);
United States v. Alex, 788 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (no screen established); Bridge Prods., Inc. v.
Quantum Chem. Corp., No. 88-C-10734, 1990 WL 70857 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1990) (screen not available
where law firm, not lawyer, changed sides); Hutnick v. Inland Steel Co., No. 86-C-2567, 1987 WL 9003
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1987) (screen not established).
38. The former client list should be retained for conflicts checks as new clients seek representation
from the firm.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 45 (1990); Cox
1993]
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allowing access to screened cases on a "need to know" basis only. Special
attention must be paid to secret codes in computer data bases. Further, separate
records, billings, and profit statements must be established.' Finally, all attorneys
and support staff in the firm must be informed of the screens.4'
Once an adequate screen is established, it will need to be either disassembled
or monitored. The former may be appropriate if the former client consents,2 or
if the prior representation is peripheral and the law firm has established that fact.43
In all other cases, screens will need monitoring for as long as the adverse
representation continues, often years. Adequate monitoring may include signs or
tags on paper and computer files, as well as on the doors or walls of screened
lawyers. To guard against inadvertent leaks of information, informal firm meetings
on screened cases may need to be abandoned in favor of formal meetings with
attendance noted."
Screened lawyers also should be kept physically separate from the rest of the
firm, whether within a unit, or by placing the screened lawyer in one unit (say,
health care) separated from another (for example, labor or litigation).' Another
way to enforce this separation suggested by securities firms is to require that
records be kept of all phone calls between screened lawyers and those working on
the screened cases. This will remind both groups that contact is appropriate for other
purposes, but that complete records must be kept to substantiate the content, date, and
duration of the call.'
Because these procedures are cumbersome and might not prevent intentional or
even inadvertent leaks, law firms may also be required to audit their firm's
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725 (1lth Cir. 1988); Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus.,
Inc., No. 84-C-6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D. I11. June 24, 1991); Keams v. Chrysler Corp., 771 F. Supp.
190 (E.D. Mich. 1991); In re Chicago South Shore & South Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Il.
1989); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986); Rowley v.
Waterfront Airways, Inc., 113 A.D.2d 926 (App. Div. 1985); INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635
F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1983).
40. See, e.g., Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1988); Dugar v. Board
of Educ., 1992 WL 142302 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1992).
41. See, e.g., Rockwel( Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-6746, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D.
Ill. June 24, 1991); Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 771 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Mich. 1991); In re Chicago South
Shore & South Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Iii. 1989); Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8
Cl. Ct. 793 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
42. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.9 (1991) (allowing the former client to
consent to the representation). Of course, this consent could be conditioned on maintaining a screen
around the lawyer responsible for the taint.
43. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Citrus Food Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129-30 (5th Cir. 1971); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), affid, 518 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1975); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg., 744 F.2d 1564, 1578-81 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
44. Doty & Powers, supra note 33, at 471-72.
45. Id. at 470.




compliance on a periodic basis.47 This task will require the establishment of a law
firm compliance department, perhaps an ethics committee or branch of a management
committee The group should establish policies and procedures that encourage
disclosure of leaks and give the committee authority to discipline those who fail to
comply with screening mechanisms. The department or committee should also be
responsible for continuing professional education that informs firm members of
policies regarding conflicts checks, establishing and maintaining screens.49
I will end, perhaps appropriately for this topic, with another dog story. About a
month before we got our puppy I told my daughter: "Be careful - you might get
what you ask for." Dogs are good companions and protectors but they also require
care and feeding - all the time. This will seem fine when you're in the mood, but
it's no fun when you're tired, disorganized, distracted by TV, or burdened by some
other responsibility.
I'll end with a similar admonition to the bar. "Be careful, you might get what you
ask for - and the ALI will help you." Then will follow the endless responsibility
of detecting, implementing, and monitoring dozens or hundreds of screens at the
same time. Remember, if you fail and the screen is inadequate, you will lose only
two things: all your fee to the current client because you're now disqualified for
conflict of interest,' and a malpractice suit by the former client based on your
breach of fiduciary duty for misusing his confidences.5'
The alternative? Live without the dog. Your life is full enough. Avoid conflicts
by caring for your current lawyers. Avoid lateral hires and mergers and strive instead
to specialize, develop and split up firms.
Perhaps with all these conflicts about conflicts the pragmatists and purists can at
least compromise by agreeing to a relevant inquiry. It is a question we all seemed
too afraid to ask and one we probably should have started with: Which rule will
better serve the public - the ALI rule allowing screens, or the traditional approach
banning them?' Will the public be better served by larger law firms with increas-
ingly changing lawyer associates and partners? Or will they be equally or better
served by smaller and more stable law firms?
47. Id. at 471-72.
48. O'Malley, supra note 25, at 361.
49. Doty & Powers, supra note 33, at 472.
50. See supra note 34.
51. See, e.g., Sherbak v. Doughty, 420 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1979); see also 1 RONALD E.
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 13.23, at 803-05 (3d. ed. 1989).
52. Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism: Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 189 (1992).
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